On Postliberalism

Currently, there exists a significant preoccupation with the theoretical and ideological movement known as postliberalism, which has gained prominence in various Christian neo-conservative circles. This movement is linked to figures such as former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance, the latter who identifies himself as a postliberal. It has emerged as a response to dissatisfaction with the perceived inadequacies of classical liberalism in fostering moral values and social cohesion.

Postliberalism represents a modern ideological shift, moving beyond the conventional liberal emphasis on individual freedom and neutrality toward a society shaped by specific, state-endorsed values. This framework rejects the classical liberal idea of a neutral public sphere, where a variety of ideas can coexist with minimal state interference. Instead, it advocates for a political structure where the state and society collaborate to promote particular moral goals.

It advocates a prominent role for the state in directing or regulating industry, moving beyond the laissez-faire principles of classical liberalism by integrating the state’s ideological objectives into corporate practices. In a more specific context, it denotes an ideological tendency that employs philosophy and theology, primarily Catholic integralism, which entails the amalgamation of Church and State, upholding distinctly anti-liberal tenets.

The protagonist of postliberalism was the jurist and political theorist Carl Schmitt (1888-1985). Schmitt rose to prominence during the waning years of the Weimar Republic in Germany in the 1920s and subsequently became notorious for his endorsement of the rising National Socialists. He argued that liberalism is dependent on systematic neutralizations—frameworks that perceive all individuals and viewpoints as equal, thus converting the inherent conflicts of political life into peaceful, regulated dialogues with open-ended, indeterminate outcomes.

In apposition, as he stipulated in his publication The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (1923):

Every democracy rests on the principle that not only are equals equal but unequals will not be treated equally…. A democracy demonstrates its political power by knowing how to refuse or keep at bay something foreign and unequal that threatens its homogeneity.

Schmitt presented a compelling intellectual argument for decisive and unilateral executive action during the “state of siege”—the exceptional moment when the survival of a government was purportedly in jeopardy. To put it mildly, strict adherence to constitutional principles could jeopardize the government’s capacity to respond to the emergency by encumbering it with judicial interference. Only the nation’s leader, its sovereign, held the perspective necessary to act decisively and navigate the crisis, or so he contended.

In 1934, Schmitt would extend this line of reasoning to its logical conclusion by writing a defense of Adolf Hitler’s actions during the Night of the Long Knives—when the Führer ordered the murder of numerous political opponents to strengthen his hold on power. Politics is essentially about recognizing and eliminating your adversaries; the sovereign is then defined as the one who determines when standard rules are suspended.

Schmitt envisioned a leader who exercised governance with confidence rather than humility, actively seeking to assert his authority as the primary influence in government. It is a head of state that, as Sam Whimster articulates,

is elected as a strong personality who will override the conventions and if necessary the constitutional rules—in order to get things done…. The state is no longer [seen as] a rational apparatus of delivery and support of the citizen but instead cast as a burden on the preference-choosing citizen.

In the opening line of his Political Theology (1922), Schmitt states the “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.” In this text, Schmitt advocates for extensive emergency powers, asserting that they should be broad and flexible, enabling the head of state to ascertain when an emergency arises and what specific actions are required to restore order. Furthermore, Schmitt’s primary concern lies in upholding the concept of a personal sovereign, advocating for a singular rule-by-law as opposed to the liberal-constitutional focus on a rule of law. He champions personal sovereignty, believing it essential for maintaining a sense of transcendence within the realm of politics.

This is altogether contrary to the political thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, who, in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Politics, advocates for tempered government and one of a mixed constitution.

The Angelic Doctor asserts that a mixed constitution (quasi commixtum) can, under certain conditions, represent the most effective form of government (optimum regimen civitatis). He contends that when a government is “tempered” through the “admixture” of another, it provides “less material…for sedition” since all parties: the king, the aristocracy, and the populace participate in the governance of the city—i.e., a certain form of “checks and balances.”

Considering that during Aquinas’ time society was predominantly feudal—yet had witnessed the emergence of absolute monarchs, such as the Capetian dynasty in France and the Holy Roman Emperor—his efforts to impose legal limitations on the sovereign were aimed at curbing tyranny. This aligns with his Treatise on Law, where he explicitly asserts that the most effective government is one characterized by a mixture of forms.

In fact, he argues that the ideal constitution (optima politia) is one that incorporates monarchy, aristocracy, and the populace—essentially, a democracy that is “well mixed” (bene commixta). This principle also extended to the smaller human communities within city-states, as the latter were expected to respect the actions of the former within their respective domains (Summa Theologiæ, I-IIæ, Q. 95. a. 4).

Indeed, he holds that the best constitution (optima politia) is one which consists of monarchy, aristocracy, and the people—i.e., a democracy, “well mixed” (bene commixta) (Summa Theologiæ, I-IIæ, Q. 105. a. 1). This, too, applied to the small human communities living in city-states, in that the latter was to respect the actions of the former in their field of activity.

There is also a disparity between postliberalism and Holy Writ, that of the state mandating ideological conformity, which is a violation of freedom of conscience. Scripture, as authoritatively taught by the Catholic Church, asserts that moral virtues cannot be imposed by external authorities; they must instead emerge from a heart oriented toward truth. Faith itself is an act of free will that cannot be forced; and any effort by the state to force belief encroaches upon the domain reserved for God. As Paul states: “So then, each of us will give an account of ourselves to God” (Romans 14:12).

Postliberalism seeks to achieve its ends via a subtle coercion, utilizing social pressure or selective access to privileges—meaning, a constriction of acceptable beliefs and values to those sanctioned by the state. This strategy signifies a significant deviation from both classical liberalism and our Catholic principles as taught by Pope Pius XI in his 1931 Encyclical Quadragesimo Anno (79). In his defense of the Church, society, and, above all, the human person, he underlined the “fundamental principle of the social philosophy: neque moveri neque mutari (fixed and unchangeable).” This meant that “one should not withdraw from individuals,” as the state was doing, “and commit to the community what they can accomplish by their own enterprise and industry.”